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People v. Buling, April 1960, G.R. No. L-13315 (Political Law Digest)

                                                                        EN BANC


[G.R. No. L-13315. April 27, 1960.]

THE PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, plaintiff and appellee, v. BUENAVENTURA BULING, defendant and Appellant.

Assistant Solicitor General Esmeraldo Umali and Solicitor Emerito M. Salva for Appellee.

Francisco A. Puray for Appellant.

SUMMARY: Accused was charged of a crime of less serious physical injuries, where he pleaded guilty. He already served his sentence, when a second information was filed against him, this time for serious physical injuries. This was after the X-ray findings showed by another physician resulted to findings that the victim will not be able to work for 1 to 2 months because of the wound. RULING: SC held that there is double jeopardy, because unlike in Melo v. People, there is no supervening fact. The reason why this new finding was not seen in the first examination was because no x-ray examination was conducted by the physician. The reason why it was not foreseen was because of the incompetence of the 1st physician. Thus, there was no supervening event because the condition was said to be already existent when the information for less serious physical injuries was filed.

 

FACTS: Appeal from a judgment of the Court of First Instance of Leyte, finding the accused Buenaventura Buling guilty of serious physical injuries and sentencing him to imprisonment of four months of arresto mayor, as minimum, to one year of prisión correccional, as maximum, and to indemnify the offended party.

Accused was charged in the Justice of the Peace Court of Cabalian, Leyte, with the crime of less serious physical injuries for having inflicted wounds on complaining witness Isidro Balaba, which according to the complaint would "require medical attendance for a period from 10 to 15 days and will incapacitate the said Isidro Balaba from the performance of his customary labors for the same period of time." The accused pleaded guilty to the complaint. On the same day he began to serve his sentence and has fully served the same.

However, Balaba’s injuries did not heal within the period estimated, and so on February 20, 1957, the Provincial Fiscal filed an information against the accused before the Court of First Instance of Leyte, charging him of serious physical injuries. The information alleges that the wounds inflicted by the accused on Isidro Balaba require medical attendance and incapacitated him for a period of from 1 1/2 months to 2 1/2 months.

ISSUE: Whether the prosecution and conviction of Balaba for less serious physical injuries is a bar to the second prosecution for serious physical injuries.

 

 

RULING: In the Melo v. People case, we stated the ruling to be that:jgc:chanrobles.com.ph

". . . Stating it in another form, the rule is that "where after the first prosecution a new fact supervenes for which the defendant is responsible, which changes the character of the offense and, together with the facts existing at the time, constitutes a new and distinct offense" (15 Am. Jur., 66), the accused cannot be said to be in second jeopardy if indicted for the new offense."

 

We do not believe that a new fact supervened, or that a new fact has come into existence. What happened is that the first physician that examined the wounds of the offended party certified on December 10, 1956 that the injury was as follows: "wound, incised; wrist lateral, right, 3/4 inch long, sutured" and that the same would take from 10 to 15 days to heal and incapacitated (the wounded man) for the same period of time from his usual work (Exh. 3). It was on the basis of this certificate that on December 8, 1956, Defendant-Appellant was found guilty of less serious physical injuries and sentenced to imprisonment of 1 month and 1 day of arresto mayor, etc.

But on January 18, 1957, another physician examined the offended party, taking an X-ray picture of the arm of the offended party which had been wounded. The examination discloses, according to the physician, the following injuries:
jgc:chanrobles.com.ph

"Old stab wound 4 inches long. With infection, distal end arm, right. X-ray plate finding after one month and 12 days - Fracture old oblique, incomplete distal end, radius right, with slight calus." (Exh. "E").

and the certification is to the effect that treatment will take from 1 1/2 months to 2 1/2 months barring complications.

Counsel for the appellant claims that no fact had supervened in the case at bar, as a result of which another offense had been committed. It is argued that the injury and the condition thereof was the same when the first examination was made on December 10, 1956, as when the examination was made on January 18, 1957, and that if any new fact had been disclosed in the latter examination failure of this new fact to be disclosed in the previous examination may be attributed to the incompetence on the part of the examining physician. We find much reason in this argument. What happened is no X-ray examination of the wounded hand was made during the first examination, which was merely superficial. The physician who made the first examination could not have seen the fracture at the distal end of the right arm, and this could only be apparent or visible by X-ray photography.

Under the circumstances above indicated, we are inclined to agree with the contention made on behalf of appellant that no new supervening fact has existed or occurred, which has transformed the offense from less serious physical injuries to serious physical injuries.

But such circumstances do not exist in the case at bar. If the X- ray examination discloses the existence of a fracture on January 17, 1957, that fracture must have existed when the first examination was made on December 10, 1956. There is, therefore, no new or supervening fact that could be said to have developed or arisen since the filing of the original action, which would justify the application of the ruling enunciated by us in the cases of Melo v. People and People v. Manolong, supra. We attribute the new finding of fracture, which evidently lengthened the period of healing of the wound, to the very superficial and inconclusive examination made on December 10, 1956. Had an X-ray examination taken at the time, the fracture would have certainly been disclosed. The wound causing the delay in healing was already in existence at the time of the first examination, but said delay was caused by the very superficial examination then made. As we have stated, we find therefore that no supervening fact had occurred which justifies the application of the rule in the case of Melo v. People and People v. Manolong, for which reason we are constrained to apply the general rule of double jeopardy.


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