People v. Tiozon, G.R. No. 89823, June 19, 1991 (Political Law Digest)

                                                  G.R. No. 89823             June 19, 1991

PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, plaintiff-appellee,
vs.
EUTROPIO TIOZON y ACID, accused-appellant.

The Solicitor General for plaintiff-appellee.
Lorenzo G. Parungao for accused-appellant.

DAVIDE, JR., J.:

SUMMARY: Accused found guily by RTC of Caloocan for violating Sec. 1 of PD 1866 for illegal possession of firearms and murder. Hence, this appeal. Can double jeopardy be invoked by the accused? No, the two crimes are not the same offense, double jeopardy can only be invoked when there are same offenses. In the case, one is a special law and the other is penalized by the RPC. The crime of murder or homicide is not absorbed by PD 1866 because it will result to an absurdity where a more serious offense is absorbed by a statutory offense which is just malum prohibitum.

FACTS: RTC of Caloocan City found the accused EUTROPIO TIOZON y ACID guilty beyond reasonable doubt of the crime of P.D. 1866 and Murder qualified by treachery and hereby sentences him to suffer life imprisonment; to indemnify the heirs of the deceased Leonardo Bolima the sum of P30,000.00; to reimburse the heirs of the victim the sum of P50,000.00 as reasonable expenses for the wake and burial expenses and to pay the costs.

In holding the accused-appellant guilty as above-stated, the court a quo relied on circumstantial evidence because the prosecution failed to present an eyewitness who could give an account as to the actual shooting incident.

On 5 July 1989 Accused-appellant filed a motion to reconsider the decision which, however, was denied by the court in its order of 16 August 1989. On 17 August accused-appellant filed a Notice of Appeal. Hence, the case is now before Us.

ISSUE: Whether or not the accued can invoke the defense of double jeopardy because the information charged was for violating Sec. 1 of PD 1866 and Murder, and whether or not the crime of murder or homicide is absorbed by PD 1866

RULING: NO. Section 1 of P.D. No. 1866 imposes the penalty of reclusion temporal in its maximum period to reclusion perpetua "upon any person who shall unlawfully manufacture, deal in, acquire, dispose or possess any firearm, part of firearm, ammunition or machinery, tool or instrument used or intended to be used in the manufacture of any firearm or ammunition." It goes further by providing that "if homicide or murder is committed with the use of an unlicensed firearm, the penalty of death shall be imposed."

It may be loosely said that homicide or murder qualifies the offense penalized in said Section 1 because it is a circumstance which increases the penalty. It does not, however, follow that the homicide or murder is absorbed in the offense; otherwise, an anomalous absurdity results whereby a more serious crime defined and penalized in the Revised Penal Code is absorbed by a statutory offense, which is just a malum prohibitum.

The rationale for the qualification, as implied from the exordium of the decree, is to effectively deter violations of the laws on firearms and to stop the "upsurge of crimes vitally affecting public order and safety due to the proliferation of illegally possessed and manufactured firearms, . . . "

In fine then, the killing of a person with the use of an unlicensed firearm may give rise to separate prosecutions for (a) violation of Section 1 of P.D. No. 1866 and (b) violation of either Article 248 (Murder) or Article 249 (Homicide) of the Revised Penal Code. The accused cannot plead one as a bar to the other; or, stated otherwise, the rule against double jeopardy cannot be invoked because the first is punished by a special law while the second, homicide or murder, is punished by the Revised Penal Code.

In People vs. Domiguez, We held:

where two different laws (or articles of the same code) defines two crimes, prior jeopardy as to one of them is no obstacle to a prosecution of the other, although both offenses arise from the same facts, if each crime involves some important act which is not an essential element of the other.

In People vs. Bacolod,  The protection against double jeopardy is only for the same offense. A simple act may be an offense against two different provisions of law and if one provision requires proof of an additional fact which the other does not, an acquittal or conviction under one does not bar prosecution under the other.