HON. CARLOS O. FORTICH, PROVINCIAL GOVERNOR OF BUKIDNON, HON. REY
B. BAULA, MUNICIPAL MAYOR OF SUMILAO, BUKIDNON, NQSR MANAGEMENT AND DEVELOPMENT
CORPORATION, petitioners,
vs.
HON. RENATO C. CORONA, DEPUTY EXECUTIVE SECRETARY, HON. ERNESTO D. GARILAO,
SECRETARY OF THE DEPARTMENT OF AGRARIAN REFORM, respondents.
FACTS: This resolves the pending incidents before us,
namely, respondents' and intervenors' separate motions for reconsideration of
our Resolution dated November 17, 1998, as well as their motions to refer this
case to this Court En banc.
Respondents and intervenors jointly argue, in fine, that our Resolution
dated November 17, 1998, wherein we voted two-two on the separate motions for
reconsideration of our earlier Decision or April 24, 1998, as a result of which
the Decision was deemed affirmed, did not effectively resolve the said motions
for reconsideration inasmuch as the matter should have been referred to the
Court sitting en banc, pursuant to Article VIII, Section 4(3) of the
Constitution. Respondents and intervenors also assail our Resolution dated
January 27, 1999, wherein we noted without action the intervenors' "Motion
For Reconsideration With Motion To Refer The Matter To The Court En
Banc" filed on December 3, 1998. They are relying on the following
constitutional provision:
Cases or matters
heard by a division shall be decided or resolved with the concurrence of a
majority of the Members who actually took part in the deliberations on the
issues in the case and voted thereon, and in no case without the concurrence of at least three of such
Members. When the required number is not obtained, the case shall be
decided en banc: Provided, that no doctrine or
principle of law laid down by the Court in a decision rendered en banc or
in division may be modified or reversed except by the Court sitting en
banc.
RULING:
A careful reading of the above constitutional
provision, however, reveals the intention of the framers to draw a distinction
between cases, on the one hand, and matters, on the other hand, such that cases are
"decided" while matters, which include motions, are
"resolved". Otherwise put, the word "decided" must refer to
"cases"; while the word "resolved" must refer to
"matters", applying the rule of reddendo singula singulis.
This is true not only in the interpretation of the above-quoted Article VIII,
Section 4(3), but also of the other provisions of the Constitution where these
words appear.
With the aforesaid rule of construction in mind, it is clear that only
cases are referred to the Court en banc for decision whenever
the required number of votes is not obtained. Conversely, the rule does not
apply where, as in this case, the required three votes is not obtained in the
resolution of a motion for reconsideration. Hence, the second sentence of the
aforequoted provision speaks only of "case" and not
"matter". The reason is simple. The above-quoted Article VIII,
Section 4(3) pertains to the disposition of cases by a division. If there is a
tie in the voting, there is no decision. The only way to dispose of the case
then is to refer it to the Court en banc. On the other hand, if a
case has already been decided by the division and the losing party files a
motion for reconsideration, the failure of the division to resolve the motion
because of a tie in the voting does not leave the case undecided. There is
still the decision which must stand in view of the failure of the members of
the division to muster the necessary vote for its reconsideration. Quite
plainly, if the voting results in a tie, the motion for reconsideration is
lost. The assailed decision is not reconsidered and must therefore be deemed
affirmed. Such was the ruling of this Court in the Resolution of November 17,
1998.
On movants' further contention in support of their plea for the referral
of this case to the Court en banc that the issues submitted in
their separate motions are of first impression.
NO. The Decision sought to be reconsidered was
arrived at by a unanimous vote of all five (5) members of the Second Division
of this Court, Stated otherwise, this Second Division is of the opinion that
the matters raised by movants are nothing new and do not deserve the
consideration of the Court en banc. Thus, the participation of the
full Court in the resolution of movants' motions for reconsideration would be
inappropriate.
Consequently, the present motions for
reconsideration necessarily partake of the nature of a second motion for
reconsideration which, according to the clear and unambiguous language of Rule
56, Section 4, in relation to Rule 52, Section 2, of the 1997 Rules of Civil
Procedure, is prohibited.
True, there are exceptional cases when this Court may entertain a second
motion for reconsideration, such as where there are extraordinarily persuasive
reasons. Even then, we have ruled that such second motions for reconsideration
must be filed with express leave of court first obtained. In this case,
not only did movants fail to ask for prior leave of court, but more
importantly, they have been unable to show that there are exceptional reasons
for us to give due course to their second motions for reconsideration. Stripped
of the arguments for referral of this incident to the Court en banc,
the motions subject of this resolution are nothing more but rehashes of the
motions for reconsideration which have been denied in the Resolution of
November 17, 1998.
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