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Concepcion v. COMELEC June 30, 2009, G.R. No. 178624 (Political Law Digest)

 G.R. No. 178624               June 30, 2009

JOSE CONCEPCION, JR., Petitioner,
vs.
COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS, Respondent.

FACTS: Petition for certiorari filed by Jose Concepcion, Jr. (petitioner) "seeking to set aside the En Banc Resolution dated 02 April 2007 and Order dated 8 May 2007" of respondent Commission on Elections (COMELEC).

The National Citizen’s Movement for Free Elections (NAMFREL) filed a Petition for Accreditation to Conduct the Operation Quick Count with the COMELEC, docketed as SSP No. 07-001. The present petitioner – then the incumbent Punong Barangay of Barangay Forbes Park, Makati City – was one of the signatories of the NAMFREL petition in his capacity as the National Chairman of NAMFREL.

COMELEC promulgated Resolution No. 7798 (Resolution 7798) that reads in full –

WHEREAS, Section 3 of Executive Order [EO] No. 94 dated March 2, 1987, provides as follows:

Sec. 3. Prohibition on barangay officials. – No barangay official shall be appointed as member of the Board of Election Inspectors or as official watcher of each duly registered major political party or any socio-civic, religious, professional or any similar organization of which they may be members.

NOW THEREFORE, to insure that elections are peaceful, orderly, regular and credible, the Commission on Elections, by virtue of the powers vested in it by the Constitution, the Omnibus Election Code [OEC], EO No. 94, and other election laws RESOLVED to prohibit, as it hereby RESOLVES to prohibit:

1. The appointment of barangay officials which includes the Punong Barangay, Barangay Kagawad, Barangay Secretary, Barangay Treasurer, and Barangay Tanod, as Chairman/person and/or Member of the BEIs or as official watcher of any candidate, duly registered major political party, or any similar organization, or any socio-civic, religious, professional [sic], in the May 14, 2007 National and Local Elections. The prohibition extends to barangay officials, employees and tanods, who are members of accredited citizens’ arms.

2. The barangay officials, employees and tanods from staying inside any polling place, except to cast their vote. Accordingly, they should leave the polling place immediately after casting their vote.

The COMELEC ruled on NAMFREL’s petition for accreditation on April 2, 2007 in the assailed Resolution (April 2, 2007 Resolution), conditionally granting NAMFREL’s petition: the condition being that,  Mr. Jose S. Concepcion, Jr., the National Chairman of NAMFREL, must first be removed both as a member and overall Chairman of said organization, being the Barangay Chairman of Barangay Forbes Park, Makati City, cannot be a member much more the overall chairman of the citizens’ arm such as NAMFREL. This is explicitly provided for in COMELEC Resolution No. 7798 promulgated on 5 January 2007.

Soon thereafter, NAMFREL filed a "Manifestation and Request for Re-Examination". The COMELEC, in its Order of May 8, 2007, noted the information relating to NAMFREL’s current officers, and denied the request to examine its (COMELEC’s) interpretation of the April 2, 2007 Resolution prohibiting petitioner’s direct participation as member and National Chairman of NAMFREL. The COMELEC reasoned out that the April 2, 2007 Resolution is clear, and NAMFREL had not presented any convincing argument to warrant the requested examination.

Instead of a direct reaction from NAMFREL, the petitioner filed the present petition for certiorari under Rule 65, ostensibly questioning the COMELEC’s April 2, 2007 Resolution, but actually raising issues with respect to Resolution 7798.

ISSUE: WON Concepcion has a personality to file the petition for certiorari

RULING: NO.

The first defect lies in the petitioner’s personality to file a petition for certiorari to address an adjudicatory resolution of the COMELEC in which he was not a party to, and where the direct party, NAMFREL, does not even question the assailed resolution. It would have been another matter if NAMFREL had filed the present petition with the petitioner as intervenor because of his personal interest in the COMELEC ruling. He could have intervened, too, before the COMELEC as an affected party in NAMFREL’s Manifestation and Request for Examination. As a last recourse, the petitioner could have expressly stated before this Court the procedural problems he faced and asked that we suspend the rules based on the unusual circumstances he could have pointed out. None of these actions, however, took place. Instead, the petitioner simply questioned the COMELEC’s April 2, 2007 Resolution without explaining to this Court his reason for using Rule 65 as his medium, and from there, proceeded to attack the validity of COMELEC Resolution 7798. Under these questionable circumstances, we cannot now recognize the petitioner as a party-in-interest who can directly assail the COMELEC’s April 2, 2007 Resolution in an original Rule 65 petition before this Court.

The requirement of personality or interest is sanctioned no less by Section 7, Article IX of the Constitution which provides that a decision, order, or ruling of a constitutional commission may be brought to this Court on certiorari by the aggrieved party within thirty days from receipt of a copy thereof. This requirement is repeated in Section 1, Rule 65 of the Rules of Court, which applies to petitions for certiorari under Rule 64 of decisions, orders or rulings of the constitutional commissions pursuant to Section 2, Rule 64. Section 1, Rule 65 essentially provides that a person aggrieved by any act of a tribunal, board or officer exercising judicial or quasi-judicial functions rendered without or in excess of jurisdiction or with grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction may file a petition for certiorari.

An aggrieved party under Section 1, Rule 65 is one who was a party to the original proceedings that gave rise to the original action for certiorari under Rule 65. We had occasion to clarify and explain the "aggrieved party" requirement in Tang v. Court of Appeals where we said:

Although Section 1 of Rule 65 provides that the special civil action of certiorari may be availed of by a "person aggrieved" by the orders or decisions of a tribunal, the term "person aggrieved" is not to be construed to mean that any person who feels injured by the lower court’s order or decision can question the said court’s disposition via certiorari. To sanction a contrary interpretation would open the floodgates to numerous and endless litigations which would undeniably lead to the clogging of court dockets and, more importantly, the harassment of the party who prevailed in the lower court.

In a situation wherein the order or decision being questioned underwent adversarial proceedings before a trial court, the "person aggrieved" referred to under Section 1 of Rule 65 who can avail of the special civil action of certiorari pertains to one who was a party in the proceedings before the lower court. The correctness of this interpretation can be gleaned from the fact that a special civil action for certiorari may be dismissed motu proprio if the party elevating the case failed to file a motion for reconsideration of the questioned order or decision before the lower court. Obviously, only one who was a party in the case before the lower court can file a motion for reconsideration since a stranger to the litigation would not have the legal standing to interfere in the orders or decisions of the said court. In relation to this, if a non-party in the proceedings before the lower court has no standing to file a motion for reconsideration, logic would lead us to the conclusion that he would likewise have no standing to question the said order or decision before the appellate court via certiorari. (emphasis supplied)

The second fatal defect lies in the petition’s thrust; it opened with and professed to be an express challenge to the COMELEC’s adjudicatory April 2, 2007 Resolution, but in its arguments solely attacks and prays for the partial nullity of COMELEC Resolution 7798 issued in the exercise of the COMELEC’s rule making power. This approach is fatally defective because the petition thereby converts an express challenge of an adjudicatory resolution – made without the requisite standing – into a challenge for the nullity of a regulation through an original Rule 65 petition for certiorari.

To be sure, a COMELEC adjudicatory action can be challenged on the basis of the invalidity of the law or regulation that underlies the action. But to do this, a valid challenge to the adjudicatory action must exist; at the very least, the petitioner must have the requisite personality to mount the legal challenge to the COMELEC adjudicatory action. Where this basic condition is absent, the challenge is unmasked for what it really is – a direct challenge to the underlying law or regulation masquerading as a challenge to a COMELEC adjudicatory action.1avvphi1

What is significant in appreciating this defect in the petition is the legal reality that the petitioner was not without any viable remedy to directly challenge Resolution 7798. A stand-alone challenge to the regulation could have been made through appropriate mediums, particularly through a petition for declaratory relief with the appropriate Regional Trial Court under the terms of Rule 63 of the Rules of Court, or through a petition for prohibition under Rule 65 to prevent the implementation of the regulation, as the petitioner might have found appropriate to his situation. As already mentioned, a challenge can likewise be made in the course of validly contesting an adjudicatory order of the COMELEC. Such challenge, however, cannot be made in an original petition for certiorari under Rule 65 dissociated from any COMELEC action made in the exercise of its quasi-judicial functions.

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