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Chua v. Executive Judge, Metropolitan Trial Court of Manila, G.R. No. 202920, October 02, 2013 (Remedial Law Digest)

 

FACTS: On 13 January 2012, herein petitioner Richard Chua tiled before the Office of the City Prosecutor (OCP) of Manila, a complaint charging one Letty Sy Gan of forty (40) counts of violation of Batas Pambansa Bilang (BP Blg.) 22 or the Bouncing Checks Law. After conducting preliminary investigation, the OCP found probable cause and, on 22 March 2012, filed forty (40) counts of violation of BP Blg. 22 before the MeTC.

Consequently, the MeTC informed petitioner that he has to pay a totalof ₱540,668.00 as filing fees for all the forty (40) counts of violation of BP Blg. 22. Finding the said amount to be beyond his means, petitioner consulted with the MeTC clerk of court to ask whether he could pay filing fees on a per case basis instead of being required to pay the total filing fees for all the BP Blg. 22 cases all at once. The MeTC clerk of court opined that petitioner could not. Petitioner was thus unable to pay any filing fees.

On 18 April 2012, petitioner filed before the Executive Judge of the MeTC a motion entitled "Urgent Motion to Allow Private Complainant to Pay Filing Fee on a Per Case Basis" (Urgent Motion). In it, petitioner reiterated his request that he be allowed to pay filing fees on a per case basis instead of being required to pay the total amount of filing fees in its entirety. The Executive Judge issued an Order denying petitioner’s Urgent Motion. In rebuffing petitioner’s Urgent Motion, the Executive Judge of the MeTC ratiocinated that granting petitioner’s plea would constitute a deferment in the payment of filing fees that, in turn, contravenes Section 1(b) of the Rule 111 of the Rules of Court. Petitioner moved for reconsideration, but to no avail. Hence, this appeal.

RULING: In proposing to pay filing fees on a per case basis, petitioner was not trying to evade or deny his obligation to pay for the filing fees for all forty (40) counts of violation of BP Blg. 22 filed before the MeTC. He, in fact, acknowledges such obligation. He, in fact, admits that he is incapable of fulfilling such obligation in its entirety.

Rather, what petitioner is asking is that he at least be allowed to pursue some of the cases, the filing fees of which he is capable of financing. Petitioner manifests that, given his current financial status, he simply cannot afford the filing fees for all the forty (40) BP Blg. 22 cases.

We see nothing wrong or illegal in granting petitioner’s request.

First. The Executive Judge erred when she treated the entire₱540,668.00 as one indivisible obligation, when that figure was nothing but the sum of individual filing fees due for each count of violation of BP Blg.22 filed before the MeTC. Granting petitioner’s request would not constitute a deferment in the payment of filing fees, for the latter clearly intends to pay in full the filing fees of some, albeit not all, of the cases filed.

Filing fees, when required, are assessed and become due for each initiatory pleading filed. In criminal actions, these pleadings refer to the information filed in court.

In the instant case, there are a total of forty (40) counts of violation of BP Blg. 22 that was filed before the MeTC.1âwphi1 And each of the forty (40) was, in fact, assessed its filing fees, individually, based on the amount of check one covers. Under the rules of criminal procedure, the filing of the forty(40) counts is equivalent to the filing of forty (40) different informations, as each count represents an independent violation of BP Blg. 22. Filing fees are, therefore, due for each count and may be paid for each count separately.

Second. In an effort to justify her refusal of petitioner’s request, the Executive Judge further argues that since all forty (40) counts of violation of BP Blg. 22 were brought about by a single complaint filed before the OCP and are now consolidated before the court, the payment of their tiling fees should be made for all or none at all.

That all forty (40) counts of violation of BP Blg. 22 all emanated from a single complaint filed in the OCP is irrelevant. The fact remains that there are still forty (40) counts of violation of BP Blg. 22 that were filed before the MeTC and, as a consequence, forty (40) individual filing fees to be paid.

Neither would the consolidation of all forty (40) counts make any difference. Consolidation unifies criminal cases involving related offenses only for purposes of trial. Consolidation does not transform the tiling fees due for each case consolidated into one indivisible fee.

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